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Peter t.  Y.  Cheung
Who’s InfluenCIng Whom? exPlorIng the InfluenCe 
of hong Kong on PolItICs  and governanCe In ChIna
aBstraCt
This paper explores how Hong Kong has influenced Chinese politics and governance 
in the constitutional, political, ideational, and intergovernmental dimensions since 
1997. Despite the growing political and economic impact of the Mainland on 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the latter has continued to influence 
the Mainland, especially southern China.
KeYWords :  China, governance, Hong Kong, intergovernmental relations, 
South China
In the early 20th century, Hong Kong was the source of inspiration 
and the political base for Sun Yat-sen in the Republican revolution that 
toppled the Qing Dynasty. After the Communist revolution in 1949, Hong 
Kong continued to exist as a British colony and became one of the newly 
industrializing economies by the 1970s. It would be difficult to imagine Chi-
na’s reform trajectory without Hong Kong’s having played a key role as a 
trading partner, financier, and investor in the reform era after 1978. Hong 
Kong had served as the main reference model for Guangdong Province, 
which championed reform and an open door policy for the entire country.
Most studies on the relationship between the Mainland and Hong 
Kong since its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 highlight their growing 
integration.1 Despite Hong Kong’s significance as a gateway for China to the 
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1. See, e.g., Peter T. Y. Cheung, “Cross-boundary State-society Interactions in South China,” in 
Dynamics of Local Governance in China during the Reform Era, Tse-Kang Leng and Yun-Han Chu, 
eds. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 273–306; Anthony Yeh et al., eds., Developing a 
Competitive Pearl River Delta in South China under One Country Two Systems (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2006).
AS5104_07_Cheung.indd   713 10/08/11   11:12 AM
714  • asIan surveY 51:4
world, the city’s relative importance has declined because the entire country 
has opened up. While Hong Kong has largely kept its distinct legal, political, 
and social systems, the political and economic influence of the Mainland on 
the city has grown enormously after 1997.2 How can Hong Kong, as a special 
administrative region (SAR) located on the southern periphery of China, 
influence politics and governance in the Mainland?3 Given the difficulties of 
measuring such influence, absent extensive longitudinal research and surveys 
of key officials and stakeholders, this paper aims to develop a framework that 
delineates the various corridors for Hong Kong’s influence on politics and 
governance in China (see Table 1).
Social and political interactions are mutual. Hong Kong is increasingly 
influenced by deepening socioeconomic integration with the Mainland and 
Chinese national policies. As an SAR, Hong Kong cannot easily influence 
high politics in China. Indeed, only in July 2003, when half a million Hong 
Kong people, around 7% of the total population, protested against planned 
national security legislation and the poor performance of the HKSAR gov-
ernment was Beijing compelled to accommodate their demands and edge 
out unpopular Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in early 2005.
However, as Sonny Lo has rightly argued, given Hong Kong’s small size 
and economic dependence on the Mainland, the SAR’s political influence, 
reflected in constitutional, participatory, institutional, and cultural dimen-
sions, is in fact “disproportionate to its tiny location on the map of China.”4 
While agreeing with Lo’s overall orientation, this paper proposes a more 
elaborate scheme (see Table 1). Hong Kong’s impact on politics and gover-
nance in China is dynamic, not static. Such influence changes over time and 
varies across sectors and locations. For instance, neighboring areas such as 
Guangdong Province and particularly the metropolis of Shenzhen are more 
likely than elsewhere to be affected by Hong Kong’s sociocultural influence 
2. See, e.g., Ming K. Chan, ed., China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects beyond 
the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008); Peter T. Y. Cheung, 
“Intergovernmental Relations between Mainland China and the HKSAR,” in Public Administration 
in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Macao, Evan M. Berman, ed. 
(Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, 2011), pp. 255–81; Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-
Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008).
3. For an earlier study, see Andrew Scobell, “Hong Kong’s Influence on China: The Tail That 
Wags the Dog?” Asian Survey 28:6 (June 1988), pp. 599–612.
4. Sonny Shiu-hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy 
(Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2010), p. 235. 
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table 1. Channels of Hong Kong’s Influence and Possible Responses by Mainland Authorities
Hong Kong Mainland Central  
and Local Governments
Constitutional Dimensions 
Maintenance of “one  
country, two systems” 
(OCTS)
High degree of autonomy in both 
local and external dimensions as 
enshrined in the Basic Law
Self-restraint and delegation 
of power; interpretation of 
the Basic Law by the Stand-
ing Committee, National 
People’s Congress (NPC)
Political Dimensions
Unsanctioned Pro-democracy movement;  
demands for reversal of verdict  
on June 4th Incident; support 
for pro-democracy activists and  
dissidents in China; participation 
in Mainland-related political 
events; activities of civil society 
groups
Control; resistance;  
penetration
Sanctioned HKSAR government lobbying  
and advocacy; official deputies  
of Hong Kong in the Chinese  
political system
Accommodation; support; 
bargaining
Ideational Dimensions
Spreading of information and values 
through mass media, educational, 
and cultural exchanges, and personal 
experiences
Control (albeit not  
necessarily thorough);  
toleration
Intergovernmental Dimensions
Administrative and  
policy arena
Training; sharing best practices; 
secondment and exchanges of  
officials; diffusion of policy ideas 
Active support and learning; 
coordination
Institutional arena Exerting influence and demands 
over the tackling of cross-boundary 
problems (e.g., public health)
Bargaining; cooperation;  
mutual compromise
source: By author.
and its spillover effect on law and politics.5 Similarly, Mainland officials 
working in the SAR or managing cross-boundary issues are best positioned 
5. Idem, “Hong Kong’s Political Influence on South China,” Problems of Post-Communism 46:4 
(July-August 1999), pp. 33–41.
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to appreciate Hong Kong’s rule-based, transparent, and professional public 
service. Some Mainlanders think that Hong Kong’s pluralistic society leads 
to indecision and policy impasses, while others admire its political pluralism, 
especially if they can live in the SAR for an extended period of time. This 
paper does not argue that Hong Kong has exerted enormous influence on 
Mainland politics, but even the basic evidence gathered here illustrates its 
substantial and continuing influence across different dimensions.
ConstItutIonal dImensIons 
Hong Kong’s exercise of a high degree of autonomy under OCTS consti-
tutes the most important evidence of its political influence on China’s 
constitutional order. Wu Guoguang suggests that the OCTS policy “was a 
constitutional way to preserve Hong Kong’s institutional advantages while 
China took over international legal or Westphalian sovereignty of the is-
land.” Wu argues that Hong Kong has enjoyed “institutional” or “soft” 
sovereignty within a sovereign China: the political institutions established 
during British colonialism have largely been preserved.6 At the day-to-day 
level, Hong Kong’s “informative” or “communicative” role, exercised 
through its social, cultural, and political influence, is changing Chinese 
political culture as information and values from the city permeate the 
Mainland.7 At the political level, the demands for a faster pace of democ-
racy in Hong Kong have made the city appealing to China’s pro-democracy 
activists, while at the same time Hong Kong’s current quasi-democratic 
system is attractive to Mainland officials and intellectuals who prefer a 
gradual approach.
The entrenchment of OCTS suggests important possibilities for China’s 
future constitutional order. There are contending views on whether Hong 
Kong’s constitutional status facilitates the development of federalism in 
China. For instance, some see Hong Kong as “an experiment in Chinese 
federalism” because substantial autonomy, notably, in economic and finan-
cial areas, has been delegated to the SAR.8 Hong Kong’s autonomies, reflected 
6. Wu Guoguang, “Hong Kong’s Political Influence over China: Institutional, Informative, and 
Interactive Dynamics of Sovereignty,” Pacific Review 21:3 (2008), p. 286.
7. Ibid., p. 296.
8. Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions, p. 232. 
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in its fiscal and monetary policies and international economic relations, have 
gone beyond those enjoyed by the constituent units of a federal state. How-
ever, when tensions between Beijing and Hong Kong emerge, the central 
authorities have always asserted the constitutional authority of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Beijing has used its constitutional power to inter-
pret the Basic Law regarding the right of abode of the children of Hong 
Kong people born in the Mainland. The Chinese government similarly has 
decided methods for election of Hong Kong’s chief executive and the Legis-
lative Council (LegCo) stipulated in Annexes I and II of the Basic Law. And 
Beijing has ruled on how to handle an unexpired term if the chief executive 
steps down early.9 The lack of an arbitration mechanism for conflict resolu-
tion between the central and local authorities reflects the unitary character 
of the Chinese polity. 
Federalism is based on pluralist, democratic political beliefs protecting the 
interests of minorities, whether territorial or community-based. Such demo-
cratic political values are not yet fully embraced in China. Hence, Hong 
Kong’s post-1997 experience does not immediately project a federalist future 
for China. Aside from the potential impact on the Communist Party of 
China (CCP), the specter of a disintegrating China may deter consideration 
of federal arrangements. Nonetheless, Hong Kong’s OCTS reflects various 
key aspects of federalism such as the separation of power between the central 
and local government, local authority over taxation, and other special privi-
leges such as allowing English to be used as an official language. Hong Kong 
people have a separate identity and hold socioeconomic and political values 
radically different from those of the Mainland. These discrete values are re-
inforced by political symbolism and privileges, including the issuance of 
HKSAR passports and their associated travel privileges, as well as de facto 
accommodation of multiple citizenships for Hong Kong residents. Ronald 
Watts regards China’s Hong Kong and Macao SARs as comprising a decen-
tralized union with federal elements.10 
9. Peter T. Y. Cheung, “Toward Federalism in China? The Experience of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region,” in Federalism in Asia, Baogang He et al., eds. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2007), pp. 253–58.
10. Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd. ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1999), p. 12.
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The future territorial division of power in China may not fully fit any 
prevailing models such as federalism, even though some scholars argue that 
China already demonstrates de facto federalism.11 Different trajectories are 
entirely possible. Should Beijing fulfill its promise of a more democratic pol-
ity for Hong Kong and sustain its autonomy into the longer future, the 
“federalist” elements of OCTS could assist the emergence of a more demo-
cratic China by accommodating institutional and ideological pluralism. 
However, Hong Kong’s autonomy must not harm Beijing’s core interests 
such as national unity and stability to achieve this end-goal. 
PolItICal dImensIons
To explore Hong Kong’s political influence on the Mainland, it is best to 
begin by examining the city’s active role in the 1989 pro-democracy move-
ment, which profoundly affected the Beijing-Hong Kong relationship. Many 
residents continue to see Hong Kong as a base from which to democratize 
the authoritarian regime in the Mainland. Similarly, Beijing regards Hong 
Kong as a subversive base. First, the scale and impact of Hong Kong’s politi-
cal organization and mobilization in 1989 showed that if Hong Kong people 
have the will to shape politics in the Mainland, such impact can be substan-
tial and its potential cannot be underestimated. In the early summer of that 
year, waves of protest were organized by Hong Kong people to support the 
students protesting in the Mainland and exert pressure on the Chinese lead-
ership. On May 21, an estimated 600,000 to one million people in Hong 
Kong protested against the imposition of martial law in Beijing. Hong Kong 
delegates to the NPC and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Com-
mittee (CPPCC) urged their respective bodies’ Standing Committees to con-
vene a meeting on the pro-democracy movement. On May 28, an estimated 
1.5 million people protested in Hong Kong. 
Celebrities in the show business community organized a concert in late 
May and successfully raised about US$1.5 million for the Hong Kong Alli-
ance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (the 
Alliance).12 On June 4, some 200,000 people joined a sit-in, and on June 5, 
11. Zheng Yongnian, “China’s De Facto Federalism,” in Federalism in Asia, Baogang He et al., 
eds., pp. 212–41.
12. Yazhou Zhoukan, “Liusi Qianhou Xianggang Dashiji” [Big events around June 4 in Hong 
Kong], Yazhou Zhoukan [Asia Weekly], June 14, 2009, pp. 26–27.
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tens of thousands congregated at the Xinhua News Agency office (China’s 
representative in the colony before 1997) to commemorate the victims of the 
crackdown.13 Hong Kong also became the conduit through which student 
leaders and other activists fled the Mainland. With the support of the British 
government, Operation Yellowbird rescued 133 activists fleeing China in 
1989; the Alliance later took over the operation, and some 300 persons had 
been rescued by 1997.14 
Second, the annual June 4 candlelight vigil organized by the Alliance, 
which remains the world’s largest commemoration of the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement, continues to insert the incident into the political discourse of 
Greater China.15 Although the number of people attending has dropped 
since 1989, the vigils commemorating the 20th and 21st anniversaries of the 
incident in 2009 and 2010 each attracted 150,000, as claimed by the organiz-
ers (or 62,800 and 113,000, respectively, as estimated by the police).16 
An increasing number of Mainlanders visiting Hong Kong joined such ac-
tivities, although their number is hard to estimate.17 Some retired cadres, 
students, and tourists from the Mainland consider Hong Kong, with its 
freedoms and degree of democracy, a source of political hope for China.18 
Many leaders of the Democratic Party (DP) and other pan-democratic poli-
ticians in Hong Kong serve as key leaders and supporters of the Alliance. 
The pan-democratic parties such as the DP and the Civic Party support 
democracy in China in their manifestos. They regularly introduce motions 
in Hong Kong’s legislature demanding the rehabilitation of the June 4 Inci-
dent, although such motions, without legislative effect, have been negated 
ever since 1997.19 
Third, Hong Kong has become a haven for individuals and organizations 
seeking to “democratize” the Mainland or to oppose the regime. For instance, 
13. Ibid.
14. Xun Jiang, “Huangque Xingdong Beihou Gangren Shemingjiuwei Neiqing” [Insider infor-
mation about the sacrifice of Hong Kong people during Operation Yellowbird], ibid., pp. 24–30.
15. Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions, ch. 1.
16. Ming Pao, June 5, 2009, p. A2; ibid., June 5, 2010, p. A1.
17. Ibid., June 6, 2009, p. A6.
18. Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 1 and 5, 2009; Xiaoyang Xie, “Minzhu Xianggang! Min-
zhu Zhongguo! Xianggang Liusi Qinghuai Zhongda Fengchao” [Democratic Hong Kong! Demo-
cratic China! Hong Kong’s June 4 mood and Chinese University’s agitation], Yazhou Zhoukan, June 
20, 2009, pp. 14–15.
19. LegCo, Voting Results: Motion on ‘Releasing LIU Xiaobo’, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/
english/counmtg/voting/v201001131.htm>, accessed September 16, 2010.
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the Alliance was established on May 21, 1989, eventually with three goals: 
(1) to support the pro-democracy movement in China; (2) after the crack-
down in early June, to reverse the official verdict on the June 4 Incident and 
its victims; and (3) to end one-party rule. Dissidents promoting democracy 
and human rights in the Mainland have worked from Hong Kong as a base. 
The China Labor Bulletin was founded in Hong Kong in 1994 by Han 
Dongfang, a railway worker who established the Beijing Autonomous 
Workers’ Federation in 1989.20 Liu Xiaobo, a leading dissident awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, has published books and articles in Hong Kong 
demanding democracy and human rights in China.21 On the occasion of 
the 60th anniversary of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Charter 08, a manifesto calling for improving China’s human rights, was 
drafted by Liu and other dissidents and signed by 300 Chinese intellectuals 
and citizens, including 61 Hong Kong activists and legislators.22 Liu was 
sentenced to prison in December 2009 for 11 years for “inciting subversion 
to state power”; numerous civil society and political groups in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere have repeatedly called for his release.23 The Falun Gong quasi-
religious social movement, which is banned in the Mainland, operates 
openly in Hong Kong.
Fourth, civil society groups and professional bodies in Hong Kong have 
openly campaigned for freedom and human rights or supported the devel-
opment of the non-government sector in the Mainland. Hong Kong’s pro-
democracy politicians, legal scholars, and lawyers have set up a China 
Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG) to champion the 
protection of China’s human rights lawyers and other legal rights defend-
ers.24 The CHRLCG connects with Mainland lawyers and acts as a bridge 
between the lawyers and the outside world. In 2009, after the Mainland 
authorities refused to renew the licenses of human rights lawyers, the 
CHRLCG wrote to law societies in the U.K. and U.S. seeking their support. 
In 2010, the group supported Mainland human rights lawyers involved in 
20. China Labor Bulletin, “Who We Are,” <http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100001>, 
accessed September 12, 2010.
21. Ming Pao, June 26, 2009, p. A31.
22. Ibid., December 24, 2009, p. A02; Edward McMillan-Scott, “Charter 08,” <http://www.
charter08.eu/2.html>, accessed September 16, 2010. 
23. Ming Pao, January 2, 2010, p. A1 and July 2, 2009, p. A1.
24. CHRLCG, “About Us,” <http://www.chrlcg-hk.org/?page_id=6#3>, accessed September 16, 
2010.
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the trials of Liu Xiaobo and also of Tan Zuoren, who openly criticized the 
corruption involved in substandard school construction. Thousands of stu-
dents reportedly died as shoddy schools collapsed during the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake.25
Similarly, the Support Group for Prisoners of Conscience in China 
(SGPCC) was formed in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Journalists Associa-
tion has long been a watchdog over freedom of speech in the Mainland. In 
2010, the association and other organizations jointly signed a statement con-
demning the sentences of Liu Xiaobo and Tan Zuoren. The groups requested 
that the Chinese government comply with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, to which China is a signatory, and release dissi-
dents.26 The Hong Kong-based Information Center for Human Rights and 
Democracy (ICHRD) provides information about human rights abuses in 
the Mainland, while the SGPCC collects data about prisoners of conscience. 
Although not strictly political by nature, Hong Kong’s non-government or-
ganizations (NGOs) have operated in the Mainland and promoted civil so-
ciety and the rights of the underprivileged. For instance, one-third of Oxfam 
Hong Kong’s total program expenses are devoted to poverty alleviation in 
the Mainland; the organization has programs in Beijing and Guangdong as 
well as in less developed areas.27 While their work includes emergency relief, 
work on AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome), and basic educa-
tion, they also cover advocacy and NGO development, which has aroused 
attention from the Party-state. In fact in February 2010, the Party core group 
of the Ministry of Education warned Chinese universities to boycott Oxfam 
Hong Kong’s volunteer training because they referred undergraduates to in-
ternships in groups that defend rights.28
Lastly, political activists on both sides have begun to support each other. 
Given Hong Kong’s freedom and access to information, activists there have 
worked with Mainland counterparts on various political projects. Since 
2004–05, Hong Kong’s Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands 
has joined hands with the Mainland’s activist, Tong Zeng, chairman of the 
25. Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 17, 2010, p. 10.
26. Hong Kong Journalists Association, “A Joint Statement on the Sentence of Liu Xiaobo and 
Tan Zuoren,” <http://www.hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1-841&lang=en-US>, accessed 
September 16, 2010.
27. Oxfam Hong Kong, “Oxfam Hong Kong: Mainland China,” <http://www.oxfam.org.hk/
en/china.aspx>, accessed September 16, 2010. 
28. Ming Pao, February 24, 2010.
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China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands.29 Although their activi-
ties did not effectively influence the Chinese government, such cross-bound-
ary political activities could become more prominent in future.
What is more interesting is that young political activists in both areas 
grew up in a more globalized world connected by the Internet. With the 
opening up of South China since 1978, Hong Kong has exerted a strong 
influence over neighboring cities such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou. More-
over, since 2003 Hong Kong has witnessed waves of confrontations against 
the HKSAR government over heritage preservation, such as the conflict 
over the demolition of the historic Star Ferry Pier in 2007 and Queen’s 
Pier in 2008. A rally supporting the use of the Cantonese language in 
Guangzhou held on two Sundays in July and August 2010 revealed the 
demonstration effect of Hong Kong’s civil society protests. In preparing for 
the Asian Games, the call by a CPPCC delegate for replacing Cantonese 
with the national language, Putonghua (i.e., Mandarin Chinese) on major 
TV channels in Guangzhou triggered protests to defend the use of Can-
tonese, both in Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Parallel to the rise of a new 
generation of young political activists in Hong Kong, hundreds of demon-
strators in these demonstrations defending the use of Cantonese in Guang-
zhou comprised mainly of the younger generation have borrowed political 
slogans and symbols from the former colony. As Lang Zi, a poet, editor, 
and blogger in Guangzhou acknowledged, people in Guangdong were “in-
spired by what Hong Kong people did to save their valuable past.”30 Some 
Hong Kong citizens even joined the protest in Guangzhou, while activists 
from the provincial capital have visited Hong Kong to learn the skills of 
political organization. 
There are narrow official channels for Hong Kong people to participate in 
Mainland affairs, mainly through their representatives at the NPC and 
CPPCC. There are no systematic studies on the impact of these Hong Kong 
deputies on Mainland politics, but their role is generally considered to be 
quite limited.31 They can receive complaints from citizens or raise issues dur-
ing meetings, but their appointments reflect recognition of their status in the 
29. The Diaoyu Islands are a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea whose control 
is contested by China and Japan. See South China Morning Post, April 23, 2004.
30. Ibid., September 19, 2010, p. 13.
31. Hualing Fu and D. W. Choy, “Of Iron or Rubber? People’s Deputies of Hong Kong to the 
National People’s Congress,” in Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for Coherence, Hua-
ling Fu and Lison Harris, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 201–27.
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Mainland rather than their ability to represent the Hong Kong community. 
By contrast, Hong Kong activists have used their freedom to organize sup-
port groups and campaigns to champion their causes such as criticizing cor-
ruption, protecting freedoms, defending legal rights, and promoting 
democracy. Should China’s political system open up further, we can envisage 
that Hong Kong’s activists may expand their activities on the Mainland or 
collaborate more broadly with their compatriots.
IdeatIonal dImensIons
The impact of the Hong Kong media on the Mainland is important, but 
very difficult to assess. Freedom of the press and of expression in Hong Kong 
not only informs the Chinese who have access to diverse views and informa-
tion about China (e.g., those who study and work in Hong Kong) but also 
engenders a demonstration effect on the Mainland media. Many Hong 
Kong newspapers and TV channels carry extensive and critical coverage of 
the Mainland. There are many restrictions that limit the reporting of Hong 
Kong’s journalists, but their professionalism and persistence have put them 
in the forefront in reporting Mainland affairs. As China opens up, Hong 
Kong’s free and vibrant media will continue to provide an alternative model 
of media for the Mainland.
In 2001, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) 
authorized Hong Kong-based Phoenix Satellite Television (PSTV) to broad-
cast its Chinese Channel into the nearby Pearl River Delta (PRD) region of 
southern China. This was the first time that an outside broadcaster was per-
mitted to broadcast into the Mainland. Before this, Mainlanders within 
range ignored the official ban on satellite dishes and gained access to PSTV 
and other overseas channels. While PSTV adopts a pro-Chinese government 
editorial line, its news and commentaries include extensive coverage of 
events in Hong Kong and Taiwan (and elsewhere) unavailable in the Main-
land. Hong Kong’s other free television programs must be broadcast through 
the cable network in Guangdong, and are subject to official censorship.32 
Whenever sensitive content is broadcast, such images are replaced with 
the promotional videos of the Hong Kong government by the Mainland 
censors. As long as Hong Kong’s media can maintain its freedom to publish or 
32. Ming Pao, June 19, 2009, p. A32.
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broadcast, it will provide a window for information and commentaries not 
allowed in the Mainland for Chinese communities around the world. 
Further, publications banned by the Mainland authorities have continued 
to be published in Hong Kong since 1997. The accessibility to such publica-
tions among Mainland Chinese is enhanced by the individual visitor scheme 
(IVS). Introduced as a liberalization measure under the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003, this scheme potentially allows 270 
million residents in 49 Mainland cities to visit Hong Kong individually.33 By 
late 2009, the scheme was further relaxed, and 45 million Mainland tourists 
had visited Hong Kong on their own.34 Newspaper stalls and bookstores in 
tourist spots put on display many Chinese-language books on Chinese poli-
tics because of the great demand from Mainlanders. One publisher, Bao Pu, 
son of Bao Tong, senior assistant to the late former General Secretary of the 
CCP Zhao Ziyang, established the New Century company in Hong Kong 
to publish sensitive books.35 Bao published the Chinese edition of Gaige Licheng 
(The secret journal of Zhao Ziyang) so that Mainlanders could have access 
to the volume.36 Indeed, 50,000 copies of the first edition were sold between 
late May and mid-July 2009. 
Other famous political books published in Hong Kong include Zhongguo 
Gaige Niandai de Zhengzhi Douzheng (The political struggles in China dur-
ing the era of reform) (2004) and Mubei (Tombstone) (2008) written by 
Yang Jisheng, a journalist previously with the Xinhua News Agency. The 
former work concerned elite political struggle in China from 1976–89, in-
cluding Yang’s three interviews with Zhao Ziyang; the latter focused on the 
devastating famine caused by the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s.37 
Even conservative politicians such as former top propaganda official Deng 
Liqun published his Deng Liqun Zishu: Shi’er ge Chunqiu (1975–1987) (Deng 
Liqun’s autobiography: Record of 12 years [1975–1987]) in Hong Kong, re-
vealing contention among top CCP leaders.38
33. Tourism Commission, Visitor Information: Individual Visit Scheme, <http://www.tourism.gov.
hk/english/visitors/visitors_ind.html>, accessed September 13, 2010.
34. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, <http://www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/speech/
speech_2308.htm>, accessed September 17, 2010.
35. New Century Media & Consulting Co., Ltd., “Newest Publications,” <http://www.newcen-
turymc.com/>, accessed September 18, 2010.
36. Ming Pao, June 5, 2009, p. A6.
37. Ibid., October 14, 2008, p. A32 and October 20, 2008, p. D4.
38. Ibid., June 1, 2006, p. D6; Deng Liqun, Deng Liqun Zishu: Shi’er ge Chunqiu (1975–1987) 
(Hong Kong: Strong Wing Press, 2006).
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Hong Kong remains the only place in China that allows the Chinese to 
enjoy access to materials on Chinese politics written from different perspec-
tives. According to the activist Hu Jia, Mainlanders experienced unprece-
dented freedom in Hong Kong, visiting uncensored websites and bringing 
home a touch of freedom via the banned books and newspapers they carried 
back.39 Such experiences might stimulate their longing for similar freedoms.40 
Further, there are tens of thousands of Mainland professionals working in 
the SAR. By March 2010, about 35,000 Mainland professionals had been 
admitted to work in Hong Kong.41 The number of full-time Mainland stu-
dents in Hong Kong’s public universities has jumped eight times from 916 
in 1997–98 to 8,795 in 2010–11.42 Whether such exposure will influence their 
political values and behavior needs to be further studied, but Hong Kong 
clearly provides an increasing number of Chinese easy access to a variety of 
information and views.
Intergovernmental dImensIons
the administrative and Policy arena: Knowledge transfer and Capacity Building
Given its reputation for efficiency and international benchmarking, Hong 
Kong’s public service has long been regarded as a model of good governance 
for the Mainland to emulate. A comparison of the World Bank’s governance 
indicators shows that Hong Kong is far ahead of the Mainland and other 
East Asian countries, and compares favorably with Japan and the U.S. (see 
Table 2). 
Hong Kong’s influence on the Mainland in promoting good governance 
flows through both knowledge transfer and capacity building. Focal points 
include the appointment of Hong Kong advisers, the training of Chinese civil 
servants, and lessons to learn from Hong Kong’s experience in anti-corruption 
and public management. Many senior civil servants and professionals from 
39. Jia Hu, “Hu Jia: One Country Does Not Need Two Systems,” <http://www.bowenpress.
com/cn/2007/comment/59_1.shtml>, accessed September 13, 2010.
40. Xun Jiang, “Xianggang Ziyouxing de Yiwai Xiaoying Huanhui Ziyou Zhongguo” [Unex-
pected effect of Individual Visit Scheme arouses freedom in China], Yazhou Zhoukan, September 
14, 2003.
41. Immigration Department, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/mp/papers/
mpsecb2-1323-1-e.pdf>, accessed September 26, 2010. 
42. University Grants Committee, <http://cdcf.ugc.edu.hk/cdcf/searchStatisticReport.do>, 
accessed July 15, 2011. 
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table 2. Quality of Governance (Percentile Rank, 2008)
Country Voice and  
Accountability
Political  
Stability
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory  
Quality
Rule of 
Law
Control of 
Corruption
China  
 Mainland
 5.8 33.5 63.5  46.4 45.0 41.1 
Hong Kong 60.6 86.1 95.3 100.0 90.9 94.2 
Taiwan 68.8 71.8 79.1  81.6 73.7 72.9 
South Korea 65.4 59.8 86.3  72.9 74.2 69.6 
Japan 76.0 79.4 89.1  86.5 89.5 85.5 
Malaysia 31.7 50.2 83.9  60.4 64.6 62.8 
Philippines 41.3 10.5 55.0  51.7 39.7 26.1 
Thailand 32.2 12.9 58.8  59.9 54.1 43.0 
Indonesia 44.2 15.8 47.4  45.4 28.7 31.4 
Brazil 61.1 38.3 54.5  58.0 46.4 58.5 
India 58.7 16.7 53.6  46.9 56.5 44.4 
Russia 21.6 23.9 45.0  31.4 19.6 15.5 
United States 86.1 68.4 92.9  93.2 91.9 91.8 
source: World Bank, Governance Matters 2009: Governance Indicators for 1996–2008, <http://info.
worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>, accessed November 15, 2010.
Hong Kong have been appointed as senior advisers, especially in finance and 
banking. For instance, Anthony Neoh, a former chairman of the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), was appointed as a chief adviser 
to the China Securities Regulatory Commission in 1998.43 Andrew Sheng, 
another retired chair of the SFC (1998–2005), was appointed as a chief adviser 
to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2005.44 Joseph 
Yam, former head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), was 
made a senior adviser to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) after his retire-
ment in 2009.
At the institutional level, the HKMA has provided extensive training to 
officials of the PBOC and the CBRC. The number of Chinese officials par-
ticipating in the training has tripled from 272 in 2002 to 857 in 2009.45 A 
senior director-general of the Financial Market Department of the PBOC 
43. Civil Service Bureau of the HKSAR, Biography of Mr Anthony NEOH, SC, JP, <http://www.
csb.gov.hk/hkgcsb/doclib/Bio-Neoh-chi&eng.pdf>, accessed September 26, 2010. 
44. Andrew Sheng, “Andrew Sheng,” <www.andrewsheng.net>, accessed September 26, 2010.
45. HK Monetary Authority, Annual Report 2002 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
2009), pp. 76, 88.
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was seconded to the HKMA in June 2010, enabling him to observe Hong 
Kong’s financial operations firsthand and also smoothing the SAR’s lobbying 
of Beijing in becoming an offshore renminbi (RMB) market in order to 
strengthen its status as an international financial center.46 Hong Kong’s 
significance as a window for China to the world is still acknowledged by 
Chinese leaders.47 Many scholars and professionals have been appointed by 
local authorities as advisers for economic and professional development. 
Since 2002, an exchange program between Hong Kong and Beijing, Shang-
hai, Hangzhou, and Guangdong was established to allow officials from each 
side to work in their partner agencies for four to eight weeks.48 Between 2002 
and 2009, 140 Mainland officials at the division director or deputy division 
director level, and 110 Mainland departments/agencies, joined the program.49 
With relaxation of rules on travel to Hong Kong, waves of Mainland officials 
have come to the SAR for different kinds of training—at their own expense. 
Hong Kong’s influence on the Chinese legal system is limited because 
under OCTS, Hong Kong maintains a U.K.-style Common Law jurisdiction. 
Because they serve a Chinese society with a developed market economy, 
Hong Kong’s laws are often used as a reference for the Mainland, but it is 
very difficult to systematically ascertain the degree of influence. In specific 
areas and sectors, Hong Kong’s impacts can be substantial. Shenzhen’s civil 
and commercial laws have drawn extensively from Hong Kong. For instance, 
laws and practices in land use, land administration, and property transfer 
have been incorporated in Shenzhen’s property laws.50 
The government and academia in Hong Kong have played a key role in 
training Chinese legal personnel to better understand its Common Law sys-
tem and international law. By mid-2009, 128 Mainland officials sponsored 
by the HKSAR government had completed a master’s degree in common law 
in Hong Kong. Since 2005, eight to 12 Mainland judicial officials have been 
 
46. Ibid., “HKMA Appointment,” <http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2010/20100607e3.
htm>, accessed September 18, 2010.
47. Duncan Alford, “The Influence of Hong Kong Banking Law on Banking Reform in the 
PRC,” East Asia Law Review 3:1 (Summer 2008), pp. 35–57. 
48. Civil Service Bureau, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/ps/papers/ps0118cb1-
860-4-e.pdf>, accessed September 24, 2010; idem, <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/
ps/papers/ps0118cb1-866-e.pdf>, accessed September 24, 2010.
49. Ibid.
50. Liu Wei, “Hong Kong’s Impact on Shenzhen Real Property Law,” Hong Kong Law Journal 
27:3 (1997), pp. 356–73. 
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invited for two weeks’ exchange in the Department of Justice in Hong Kong 
annually.51 In collaboration with the National Judges College of the Supreme 
People’s Court of China and Columbia University, the City University of 
Hong Kong in 2009 launched a one-year master’s program for about 30 
Chinese judges.52 Each year, two batches of 30–35 senior judges attend an 
intensive four-week training taught by scholars, senior judges, and lawyers 
in Hong Kong.53 As acknowledged by the vice president of the Guangdong 
Provincial High Court, such exchanges have helped China’s judges not only 
to learn from Hong Kong’s legal system but also to improve and reform 
China’s.54 Hong Kong remains an important window to the outside world 
for China, and as the number of court cases involving Hong Kong and other 
foreign parties grows, the president of the Supreme People’s Court has ex-
pressed confidence that Chinese juridical officials can learn much from 
Hong Kong’s legal experience.55
The impact of Hong Kong’s experience on China’s efforts against corrup-
tion is well recognized by the Mainland authorities, which began learning 
from the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in the 1980s. 
The first anti-corruption unit in China was established under the Guang-
dong Provincial People’s Procuratorate in August 1989, drawing upon the 
ICAC example. Guangdong in particular has borrowed extensively from 
Hong Kong’s experience. After two former mayors of Shenzhen were arrested 
for corruption, China’s central authorities in Fall 2009 demanded that Shen-
zhen officials study the ICAC’s experience in corruption prevention.56 Zhu 
Guoming, party secretary of Guangdong’s Commission for Discipline In-
spection, argued that Mainland authorities should learn from the ICAC’s 
experience in combating corruption.57 
51. Department of Justice, <http://www.doj.gov.hk/justice/commonlaw/chi/index.htm>, 
accessed October 1, 2010.
52. Legal Daily (Beijing), July 23, 2009, <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=
366656&k_title=%CF%E3%B8%DB&k_content=%BD%BB%C1%F7&k_author>, accessed October 
10, 2010; People’s Court Daily (Beijing), January 11, 2010, <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.
php?id=390062>, accessed October 10, 2010.
53. City University of Hong Kong, School of Law, “International Collaboration,” <http://www.
cityu.edu.hk/slw/eng/global/international.html>, accessed October 10, 2010. 
54. Legal Daily, July 23 2009, <http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=366656&k_
title=%CF%E3%B8%DB&k_content=%BD%BB%C1%F7&k_author=>, accessed October 10, 2010.
55. Ibid. 
56. Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 25, 2009, p. 17.
57. Lianhe Zaobao [United Morning News] (Singapore), December 8, 2009, p. 14.
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Various practices in Hong Kong have already been adopted to reduce 
regulatory loopholes for corruption. For instance, in May 2004, drawing 
from Hong Kong’s practice, Shenzhen decided that all infrastructural projects 
would be managed by the Bureau of Public Works, in order to achieve effec-
tive monitoring.58 Exchanges between Hong Kong and the Mainland over 
integrity management have been frequent, and the number of Chinese offi-
cials briefed annually by the ICAC rose steadily from 3,000 in 1997 to 5,000 
in 2009.59 Both central and local officials for years have called for learning 
from Hong Kong’s anti-corruption experience. Nonetheless, owing to the 
differences in the two politico-legal systems and the multiplicity of Party-state 
organs involved in anti-corruption, Chinese authorities have not fully ad-
opted the institutional design of the ICAC model. The Party’s own discipline 
inspection system remains the most important anti-corruption entity. 
the Institutional arena: extending hong Kong’s Influence through 
Intergovernmental Cooperation
With the growing socioeconomic integration between Hong Kong and 
South China, many intergovernmental mechanisms have been created to 
manage emerging cross-boundary problems. Although such networks are not 
dominated by Hong Kong, the HKSAR government can use them as a plat-
form to influence its Mainland counterparts. In particular, Hong Kong has 
received strong support from the central government, creating an incentive 
for Guangdong’s leadership to team up with the SAR in seeking policy sup-
port from Beijing. The following section illustrates such efforts for national 
and regional planning, food safety, public health, and the environment.
Policy Advocacy in National and Regional Planning
With blossoming competition among China’s regions, the HKSAR and 
Guangdong governments have found it useful to work as partners in seeking 
preferential treatment from the central government. Abandoning its pre-
1997 suspicions about integration with the Mainland, the HKSAR govern-
ment has been active in ensuring a role for Hong Kong in regional 
development. Since 2004, the government has actively participated in the 
58. Xinhua Net, June 15, 2004, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-06/15/content_ 
1527540.htm>, accessed October 1, 2010.
59. Hong Kong Yearbook 1997 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1997), p. 294; Hong Kong Year-
book 2009 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2009), p. 323.
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Pan PRD Regional Cooperation network for coordination and development, 
involving nine provinces and the two SARs. For the first time since 1997, the 
HKSAR government requested that central authorities incorporate Hong 
Kong in national development planning in 2006. Consequently, China’s 
Eleventh Five Year Plan (FYP) supports the development of Hong Kong’s 
financial services, logistics, tourism, and information services, and says its 
status as a financial, shipping, and service center shall be maintained. 
In 2009, Guangdong’s Party Secretary Wang Yang championed closer co-
operation between Guangdong and Hong Kong in order to secure more 
central support and reposition the PRD as a key economic region. He lob-
bied various ministries and commissions in Beijing by teaming up with 
Hong Kong, because the central government had strongly supported Hong 
Kong since 2003.60 The promulgation in early 2009 of The Outline of the Plan 
for the Reform and Development of the PRD (2008–2020) by the National Re-
form and Development Commission (NRDC) not only reaffirmed the spe-
cial role played by Guangdong in reform and supported its various policy 
initiatives: it also endorsed a division of labor between Hong Kong and the 
PRD as well as Hong Kong’s position as an international finance, trading, 
shipping, logistics, and high-value-added service center.61 In April 2010, 
Hong Kong and Guangdong signed the Framework Agreement on Hong 
Kong/Guangdong Cooperation to turn these broad policy goals into specific 
items for cooperation. 
Since 2009, Hong Kong has been actively lobbying the central govern-
ment to endorse the Outline Plan in the Twelfth FYP.62 Specifically, the 
HKSAR government wants continued central support for Hong Kong’s sta-
tus as an international financial, commercial, and shipping center (especially 
through enlarging its RMB business). Officials also seek to expand Hong 
Kong’s services in the Mainland under CEPA and to reaffirm Hong Kong’s 
role as a key driver of financial development in the PRD.63 Having central 
endorsement enables the HKSAR government to better deal with Mainland 
agencies over policy coordination and implementation.
60. Interview with a Guangdong expert, Guangzhou, November 16, 2009. 
61. NRDC, <http://www.gddpc.gov.cn/zwgk/fzgh/qygh/zjsjz/200902/P020090206545000318684.
doc>, accessed September 17, 2010.
62. Ta Kung Pao, August 29, 2010, p. A7.
63. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, <http://www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/speech/
speech_2308.htm>, accessed October 7, 2010.
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Coping with Health and Food-safety Issues
With close scrutiny from a vigilant media and public over health and food-
safety incidents, the HKSAR government has been obliged to work with 
relevant Mainland authorities to jointly address such issues. The cross-
boundary notification mechanism on infectious diseases by the time of the 
outbreak of SARS in 2003 was problematic. Only news reports told Hong 
Kong it faced an epidemic, after SARS spread in South China in early Febru-
ary. The crisis spawned notification mechanisms on infectious diseases be-
tween the Chinese Ministry of Health and the HKSAR Department of 
Health by mid-year. Health authorities from Hong Kong, Macao, and the 
Mainland later shared information and statistics and now monitor 28 types 
of infectious disease. Another agreement on cooperation over emergency 
response was signed in 2006.64
Government agencies in the Mainland and the HKSAR have been coop-
erating since July 2003 to tackle rising concerns over food safety and public 
health problems. That November, the State General Administration of Qual-
ity Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and Hong Kong’s 
Health, Welfare, and Food Bureau (HWFB) agreed to implement various 
food safety measures.65 Although a mechanism monitoring and quarantining 
vegetable supplies to Hong Kong had been operating since the 1980s, the 
monitoring of livestock, poultry, and freshwater fish has remained an issue 
in recent years. Concerns have been raised about the presence of streptococ-
cus suis, a porcine pathogen. Scientists also worry about the use of the 
widely banned dye compound malachite green against oömycetes, microor-
ganisms that can infect freshwater fish.
Such concerns prompted both sides to formulate an emergency response 
mechanism in October 2005. The AQSIQ and Hong Kong’s Environmental 
and Hygiene Department later agreed on new quarantine procedures for 
chilled ducks and geese exported to Hong Kong.66 Liaison agreements be-
tween the HKSAR and Guangdong for urgent high-level meetings in case of 
significant incidents were reached in April 2006.67 In response to growing 
64. HKSAR government, Tripartite Meeting on Infectious Diseases Held in Dongguan, <http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200606/29/P200606290161.htm>, accessed October 7, 2010.
65. HKSAR government, AQSIQ and HWFB Sign Co-operation Arrangement, <http://www.info.
gov.hk/gia/general/200311/17/1117226.htm>, accessed October 7, 2010.
66. Hong Kong Commercial Daily, July 1, 2006, p. B9.
67. HKSAR government, Framework Agreement on Exchanges and Co-operation in Food Safety Signed, 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200604/11/P200604110145.htm>, accessed October 7, 2010.
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food safety problems, various inspection and quarantine measures for food 
and agricultural products were introduced in 2007–09. Such efforts by the 
HKSAR government in shaping Guangdong’s governance of health and food 
safety had helped reduce the frequency of incidents. In fact, Guangdong’s 
advisers urged the provincial government to adopt Hong Kong’s manage-
ment, registration, and monitoring system to ensure better food safety in the 
province.68
Ensuring Water Quality
Hong Kong has played a major role in enhancing the transparency in infor-
mation about water quality because it has relied mainly upon water from 
Guangdong since the 1960s. The latest agreement contains provisions on the 
quality of Dongjiang (East River) water supplied to Hong Kong. Apart from 
building a dedicated aqueduct to link the intake at Dongjiang and the Shen-
zhen Reservoir in June 2003, the Guangdong water authority operates a 
monitoring and control system as well as a mechanism to exchange informa-
tion with Hong Kong regularly.69 These efforts have greatly enhanced the 
transparency of information relating to water quality and water management 
in the Mainland. Under the mechanism, Guangdong provides water quality 
monitoring data on a monthly basis. Data supplied to Hong Kong are deliv-
ered on a daily and weekly basis. Hong Kong publishes some of these data 
through the Internet, including some data provided by the Environmental 
Protection Department in Guangdong.70 The availability of such informa-
tion has helped the Hong Kong community to monitor Dongjiang water 
quality and Guangdong authorities to further improve it. 
Improving Regional Air Quality
With rapid industrialization in the PRD since 1978, deteriorating air quality 
in the region became a serious public concern in Hong Kong. A break-
through was achieved in 2002 when the HKSAR government secured 
Guangdong’s consent to reduce emissions by 2010 of four major air pollut-
ants: sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, respirable suspended particulates 
68. Guangdongshen Remin Zhenfu Canshi Shi, eds., Canshi Jian Yan [Suggestions from advisers] 
(Hong Kong: China Review Academic Publishers, 2009), pp. 294–99.
69. Water Supplies Department, Dongjiang Raw Water, <http://www.wsd.gov.hk/en/water_
resources/raw_water_sources/dongjiang_raw_water/index.html>, accessed September 27, 2010.
70. Ibid., para. 32.
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(RSP), and volatile organic compounds (VOC).71 Although environmental 
groups criticized these efforts as insufficient, it was the first time Hong Kong 
got Guangdong to commit to specific targets and enhance the transparency 
of information disclosure. In December 2003, both sides formulated the 
PRD Regional Air Quality Management Plan.72 A PRD Regional Air Qual-
ity Monitoring Network with 16 monitoring stations was jointly established 
in mid-2005. Since late that year, an index of daily air quality information 
for various parts of the PRD region has been released online; a report is 
jointly submitted every half year. A set of standard operating procedures for 
monitoring has been jointly developed. These cooperative efforts have 
spurred greater objectivity in data collection and transparency of air quality 
information in Guangdong. 
the Case of shenzhen 
Shenzhen merits special treatment because it has been borrowing so system-
atically from Hong Kong that it may well become an extension of a quasi-
Hong Kong development model. The latest impetus by Shenzhen stems from 
its economic transformation from a manufacturing base to a more diversified 
economy with a growing service sector. Because the land resources are almost 
all developed, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) looks to move up the value 
chain and seek closer economic integration with Hong Kong in order to build 
a modern service economy using the latter’s management and regulatory ex-
pertise. Xu Zongheng, the former mayor of Shenzhen (2005–09), publicly 
argued that despite the differences between the two areas, Shenzhen should 
not only “serve Hong Kong” but also “learn from Hong Kong” in areas such 
as social management, urban construction, public service, government opera-
tion, and democracy and law (minzhu fazhi).73 Although Xu was arrested for 
corruption in 2009, his successor has not deviated from his path. In 2010, 
Shenzhen’s Party chief Wang Rong regarded Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Seoul as the benchmarks for further development.74 The following analysis 
71. HKSAR government, Joint Statement on Improving Air Quality in the Pearl River Delta Region, 
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200204/29/0429128.htm>, accessed October 7, 2010.
72. Environmental Protection Department, Reducing Emissions to Improve Regional Air Quality, 
<http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/news_events/legco/files/EAPanel_Paper_29Sept05.pdf>, 
accessed October 7, 2010.
73. Shenzhen Economic Daily, April 22, 2008.
74. Qiushi [Seeking Truth], September 1, 2010, <http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2010/201017/
201008/t20100830_45028.htm>, accessed September 15, 2010. 
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focuses on Hong Kong’s influence on Shenzhen’s administrative and political 
reforms and the planning of Qianhai District. 
Hong Kong as a Reference for Administrative Reform
In November 2001, the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform 
approved Shenzhen as a test site for deepening administrative reform; delega-
tions were sent to study the administrative systems in Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and the U.K. in January 2002.75 Shenzhen’s reform proposal aimed to 
differentiate administrative powers into three areas: policy formulation, ex-
ecution, and supervision (juece, zhixing, jiandu). Former Mayor Yu Youjun 
argued that decision-making bodies should focus on policy making but not 
implementation, executive agencies should mainly be doing policy imple-
mentation but not formulation, and supervisory and auditing bodies should 
jointly conduct supervision.76 Huang Weiping, a professor at Shenzhen Uni-
versity and a major drafter of the blueprint, confirmed that the reform had 
drawn various lessons from Hong Kong.77
Shenzhen endorsed the plan for administrative reform in March 2006, but 
it was not fully implemented.78 The actual launch did not come until after 
December 2008, when the Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Develop-
ment of the PRD finally supported this initiative. In May 2009, the State 
Council further approved the Master Plan to Pilot Comprehensive Reform in 
Shenzhen and indicated that the city should learn from Hong Kong’s regula-
tions and operating mechanisms and seek closer cooperation.79 By August 
2010, seven policy-making commissions were set up in Shenzhen to shoulder 
policy-making, planning, and supervisory functions. Under them were 18 
policy execution bureaus.80 
Hong Kong’s emphasis on “small government, big society” provides a 
model for recasting the relations between the state and society in Shenzhen.81 
In Hong Kong, professional bodies of law, accounting, and medicine regulate 
75. 21st Century Business Herald, April 1, 2004, p. 6.
76. Xin Jing Bao [Beijing News], May 25, 2009, p. A1. 
77. Ming Pao, March 28, 2004, p. B06; Wen Wei Po, September 28, 2002, p. A5.
78. Southern Metropolis Daily, March 11, 2008, p. A37; Xin Jing Bao, May 25, 2009, p. A1.
79. Shenzhen News, May 27, 2009, <http://www.sznews.com/zhuanti/content/2009-05/27/
content_3796662.htm>, accessed September 15, 2010.
80. Xinhuanet, August 10, 2010, <http://www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/ztbd/2010-08/10/
content_20582845.htm>, accessed September 14, 2010.
81. Wen Wei Po, July 20, 2009, p. A13.
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their own professions, and the government only focuses on monitoring their 
practices in accordance with the law. In June 2004, a Bureau of Professional 
Associations was established under the Shenzhen government. In 2006, 
the bureau was combined with the Office of Civic Associations under the 
Bureau of Civil Affairs to form the Bureau of Civic Associations. Since 2008, 
business, social welfare, and charity bodies no longer had to attach themselves 
to “supervisors” (yewu zhuquan danwei) after formal registration.82 In order 
to build a “harmonious society,” Shenzhen promoted the profession of social 
work and the outsourcing of social services through competitive bidding to 
service providers, copying from Hong Kong’s experience. In 2008, Shenzhen’s 
Civil Affairs Bureau introduced a major program so that its social workers 
would be trained and supervised by Hong Kong’s non-profit professionals.83 
Shenzhen’s civil service reform also followed Hong Kong’s experience by 
introducing non-civil service contracts in June 2000.84 Starting from 2010, 
all civil servants would be employed on a contractual basis, renewable every 
three years.85 Under Mayor Xu Qin, who has a doctorate in business admin-
istration from Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Shenzhen will send prom-
ising officials to Hong Kong for short-term training in subjects ranging 
from urban management to social development, in order to build a service-
oriented government.86
Engaging Hong Kong to Build the Qianhai District 
After intense lobbying from Shenzhen, the State Council in August 2010 
approved its plan to develop the Qianhai District into a demonstration zone 
for modern services by learning from Hong Kong. Various advisers proposed 
turning Qianhai into “a Special Zone within a Special Zone.”87 Shenzhen’s 
Party Secretary Wang Rong maintained that Shenzhen would learn from 
82. Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, February 23, 2010, p. A1.
83. Institute of Social Service Development, ed., Xianxing Xianshi: Shenzhen Shegong Zhuanye 
Shanliangdian [Move first, try first: Shenzhen social work professional double spotlights] (Hong 
Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co., 2010).
84. Chengdu Daily, August 24, 2010, p. 8.
85. Wen Wei Po, June 12, 2010, p. A20.
86. Human Resources and Social Security Administration of Shenzhen Municipality, 2009 Nian 
Shenzhen Shi Xingzheng Jiguan Gongwuyuan Peixun Gongzuo Jihua [Training plan for civil servants 
in Shenzhen’s administrative organizations 2009], <http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/rsxx/jypx/200911/
t20091113_1227087.htm>, accessed September 21, 2010. 
87. Wen Wei Po, August 30, 2010, p. A6.
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Hong Kong in managing Qianhai.88 Unlike Pudong, Shanghai’s rapidly de-
veloped industrial and service district, Qianhai did not adopt a management 
committee system but set up the Qianhai Management Bureau. This re-
sembled the Airport Authority in Hong Kong, established by the govern-
ment but run as a public corporation.
In September 2010, the Qianhai bureau suggested that it would follow 
Hong Kong practices in three areas: (1) lowering the tax rates for companies 
and salary taxpayers to a level closer to that of Hong Kong; (2) allowing the 
establishment of offshore finance and arbitration companies from Hong 
Kong; and (3) introducing a pilot proposal for the convertibility of the RMB 
in order to develop Shenzhen’s function as a financial market.89 Whether this 
bold experiment will be fully implemented remains to be seen, but its plan-
ning already reflects knowledge transfer from Hong Kong and the reference 
value of its financial, administrative, and legal systems. 
Shenzhen as a Special Political Zone?
Because Hong Kong’s political system differs from the Mainland’s, it is im-
possible for China’s localities to draw directly from the former colony’s expe-
rience. However, officials and scholars in Guangdong who have knowledge 
of Hong Kong affairs understand the merits of a more open society, transpar-
ent government, and the rule of law. They are at the forefront advocating 
more reform, including political reform, in South China. Since 2000, there 
have been various attempts by the Shenzhen government to introduce politi-
cal reform, but these proposals, including a comprehensive package sug-
gested in 2008, failed because of lack of central support.90
Nonetheless, Hong Kong is often used as an example. For instance, a lead-
ing adviser in Shenzhen argued that the SEZ should take one step forward 
in political reform, adding that it made more sense to learn from Hong 
Kong and Singapore, rather than the U.S., U.K., or other developed Western 
countries.91 The Guangdong Reform Studies Association, comprising mainly 
retired provincial officials and scholars from Shenzhen and Guangzhou, in 
88. Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, September 1, 2010, p. A2.
89. South China Morning Post, November 8, 2010, p. A3; Wen Wei Po, September 10, 2010, p. A30.
90. Huang Weiping and Hu Xueliang, “2008 Nian Shenzhen ‘Zhenggai Caoan’ Jiedu” [An in-
terpretation and reading of the 2008 Political Reform Draft], Shehui Kexue Yanjiu [Social Sciences 
Studies], no. 1 (March 2010), pp. 62–67.
91. Guangdong Gaige [Guangdong Reform], no. 2, August 2010, p. 34. 
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mid-2010 completed a government-sponsored consultancy to explore Shen-
zhen’s future trajectory.92 One retired senior official with extensive knowledge 
of Hong Kong advocated various political reform measures for Guangdong, 
with Shenzhen serving as the test site.93 He proposed the direct elections of 
officials at the town and county levels in the countryside and street and 
urban district levels in the cities; strengthening the power of the people’s 
congresses, especially over public finance and government appointments; 
and allowing community and business organizations to nominate candidates 
for people’s deputies.
Other proposals included allowing campaigning by candidates and reduc-
ing state intervention in economic and social affairs. It is no coincidence that 
the more-daring advocates of political reform have working experience in 
Hong Kong affairs. Besides scholars and officials, some business persons such 
as the founder of Vanke, Wang Shi, a leading Shenzhen-based real estate 
developer, have suggested that Shenzhen should learn from Hong Kong by 
promoting democratic elections, citizen rights, and civil society.94 Although 
President Hu Jintao’s speech commemorating Shenzhen’s 30th anniversary 
in October 2010 did not designate Shenzhen as a “special political zone,” 
Premier Wen Jiabao has reiterated that without the safeguard of political 
reform, the fruits of economic reform will be lost and the goal of moderniza-
tion cannot be achieved.95 Divergent views among China’s top leaders and 
their overriding concern with stability have thwarted political experiments 
in Shenzhen. However, attempts to introduce political reform have never 
ceased there: should China expedite political reform again, Shenzhen may 
likely become a test site. 
ConClusIon 
As China globalizes, Hong Kong will no longer remain the sole model for 
reference. The political and economic influence of the Mainland in Hong 
Kong has also increased significantly since 2003. Nonetheless, Hong Kong’s 
values, practices, and experiences have already been selectively incorporated 
92. See the website of this association at <http://www.gser.cn/>, accessed on October 31, 2010.
93. Guangdong Gaige, no. 2 (August 2010).
94. Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 13, 2010, p. 36.
95. China Daily, August 23, 2010, p. 2; Yazhou Zhoukan, “Zhongguo Zhenggai zhi Zheng: 
Nangfang Ribao vs. Guangming Ribao” [Debate over China’s Political Reform: Nanfang Daily vs. 
Guangming Daily], Yazhou Zhoukan, September 19, 2010, pp. 26–31.
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in different sectors in the Mainland, most notably in South China. Consti-
tutionally, Hong Kong’s entrenchment of OCTS demonstrates the value of 
institutional diversity and suggests multiple possibilities for China’s evolving 
constitutional order. Politically, aside from offering support to dissidents, 
lawyers defending human rights, or other pro-democracy forces in China, 
Hong Kong’s pursuit of democracy will have major implications if China 
embarks upon political reform.96 With the commitment for universal suf-
frage to elect the chief executive in 2017 and the LegCo in 2010, China has 
proposed a democratic road map for Hong Kong. Although the exact details 
for these elections are not finalized, the importance of this democratic ex-
periment within the Chinese body politic should not be discounted. At the 
intergovernmental level, the Mainland authorities in South China have se-
lectively utilized Hong Kong’s experiences in improving their governance. 
With the growing integration between the two areas, Hong Kong’s informal 
influence will expand even further. While being embraced by a rising China, 
Hong Kong has continued to play a unique role in influencing its gover-
nance and politics. 
96. Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions. 
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